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NOTES
Blanket Licensing: The Clash Between Copyright
Protection and the Sherman Act*
I. Introduction
Music has a ubiquitous presence in the American culture. Radio, televi-
sion, the piano player at the local cocktail lounge-all involve the public perfor-
mance of musical compositions, often subject to copyright protection. Conse-
quently, each rendition invokes a complex scheme of legal relationships. Com-
posers and lyricists of copyrighted compositions possess statutory rights, in-
cluding the exclusive right to public performance of their works.' Protecting
these rights from infringement, however, has proved a difficult task.
Blanket licensing2 has become the standard method by which writers and
publishers of copyrighted works protect their exclusive public performance
rights. Issued by performing rights societies, 3 blanket licenses authorize the use
of any work in the repertory of the issuing society for the duration of the
license. Although this system has proven an effective means by which isolated
composers of musical works can enforce copyright protection, its legality under
the antitrust laws has been suspect for some time.4 Indeed, reconciling blanket
licensing and the Sherman Act has consumed considerable judicial resources.5
The heart of the issue involves a clash between the promotion of artistic efforts
and the prohibition of unfair trade practices.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze blanket licensing in light of the an-
This Note was entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition.
I The exclusive right to public performance of copyrighted works is provided by 17 U.S.C. 5 106(4)
(1976). "Public performance" is defined at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). It provides in pertinent part:
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by
means of any device or process ....
To perform or display a work "publicly" means-
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substan-
tial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place
or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.
Exceptions to the definition are found at 17 U.S.C. §§ 110, 111(a) (1976).
The exclusive right to public performance is limited by 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-18 (1976). Of particular im-
portance is 17 U.S.C. 5 110(4) (1976) which makes noncommercial performance not infringement.
2 See text accompanying notes 21-25 infra for a discussion of blanket licenses.
3 The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI), and SESAC are the most significant performing rights societies.
4 In 1941 the Justice Department challenge blanket licensing. United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No.
13-95, [1940-43] Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (hereinafter cited as 1941 Decree), amended,
[1950-51] Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (hereinafter cited as 1950Judgment); United States
v. BMI [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (hereinafter cited as 1966 Decree). The suits
resulted in consent decrees that regulate ASCAP's and BMI's licensing arrangements with users of their
works. See text accompanying notes 29-35 infra for a discussion of the consent decrees.
5 See, e.g., Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683 (1961); K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin
Publishing Co., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); United States v. ASCAP (Ap-
plication of Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc.), 331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997
(1964); Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130
(2d Cir. 1977), reo'd& renandedsub noan. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, motionfor summaryjudgment denied, 607 F.2d
543 (2d Cir. 1979) (hereinafter cited as CBS); Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y.
1948); M. Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948), (appeal dismissed mem. sub nor. M.
Witmark & Sons v. Berger Amusement Co., 177 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1949).
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titrust laws. In particular, it will discuss recent assaults on blanket licensing as
price fixing per se; whether blanket licensing is so plainly anticompetitive as to
warrant per se classification; and whether it can survive a reasonableness in-
quiry. Finally, a solution to this debacle will be tendered. However, before this
endeavor can be pursued, it is necessary to explain the function and nature of
performing rights societies and the various licensing arrangements they offer.
II. Performing Rights Societies
The author of a musical composition is entitled to copyright protection
once his creation is reduced to some "tangible medium of expression." 6 This
protection includes the right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly." 7
Policing for infringement, however, is extremely difficult due to the ephemeral
nature of a musical performance and the widespread, simultaneous use of
musical works.8 The author cannot detect a fleeting infringement unless he or
an informant is present to observe the violation of his exclusive right. Further-
more, those wishing to perform a select work with the author's permission are
confronted with the problem of locating the author and negotiating terms. 9
This increases the costs of utilizing copyrighted works and encourages an
otherwise honest user to infringe.
Performing rights societies formed in response to these problems. 10 In
1914 ASCAP was established to serve as a "clearing house"" for copyright
owners and users. Authors and composers united with publishers in the non-
profit joint venture, which is now the largest performing rights society in the
United States.' 2 The mechanics of the society's operations center around a
6 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(2) (1976).
7 Id. at § 106(4). This replaced similar protection provided by Act ofJan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481
(replaced 1906).
8 See generally Finklestein, ASCAP as an Example of the Clearing House System in Operation, 14 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 2 (1966); 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.19 (1979).
9 Finldestein, supra note 8.
10 The Societe des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM), established in France in
1929, was the first performing rights society. S. ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF
Music 27 (1954).
11 Finklestein, supra note 8. See also S. SHEMEL & W. KRASILOVSFY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 163-79 (P.
Ackerman ed. 2d rev. ed. 1978) (hereinafter cited as SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY).
12 ASCAP's membership is composed of over 17,800 authors (composers and lyricists) and 4,800
publishers. SHEMEL & KRAsILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 163. The 1950Judgment requires that membership be
open to individuals meeting certain criteria. In the case of lyricists and composers, the copyrighted work
must have been commercially recorded or regularly published. "Associate membership" is available to
those authors who have had one work copyrighted, notwithstanding that it has not been recorded or pub-
lished. For publishers, membership is contingent upon publishing activity, that is, one must have regularly
engaged in the publication of musical compositions so as to have assumed the normal financial risks usually
incurred in the publishing business. The ASCAP membership fee is $50 yearly for publishers and $10 for
authors. Id. at 167.
Internally ASCAP is governed by a 24-member Board of Directors, composed of 12 writers and 12
publishers. Articles of Association of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, Article
IV 5 1 (1979) (available from ASCAP). The management of the daily affairs of the society is the responsibili-
ty of the president. Id. at Article VII.
ASCAP's function is that of a clearinghouse or broker of performing rights. See Comment, The Mid-
dleman as Price Fixer: Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, 91 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1977). The society issues licenses for the use of copyrighted musical
works. Licensees include radio and television stations, restaurants, bars, hotels, theaters and other
businesses. See note 24 infra. Fees are collected from users and distributed to the ASCAP membership. Fees
are determined as a percentage of gross receipts of the user or a flat amount, less adjustments such as agency
commissions and wire chargers. The rate is slightly less than two percent of adjusted gross receipts in the
[June 1980]
[Vol. 55:729]
licensing scheme. ASCAP members grant the society the nonexclusivet3 right
to license nondramatic rights1 4 in their musical compositions. ASCAP in turn
licenses users to perform the works in its catalogue.
ASCAP prevailed as the sole performing rights society in the United
States until 1939. In that year BMI t5 was founded by- station owners in an at-
case of radio stations. SHEMEL& KRAsiLovsKy, supra note 11, at 163.
After deductions for overhead costs, receipts are divided equally between writers as a group and
publishers as a group. Id. Each group then distributes its share among its members according to its own for-
mula. Pursuant to the consent decree, a composer may elect to receive remuneration based solely on the
number of performances of his works, or he may choose the complex "spreading of funds" formula. Order
Approving Consent Decree, Attachment A, United States v. ASCAP, Civ. No. 13-95 (S.D.N.Y. as amend-
edJuly 30, 1976); SHEMEL & KRAsILovsKY, supra note 11, at 168-70. Key in the royalty distribution system
are the number and kind of performance logged in ASCAP's survey. ASCAP: THE FACTS (1979) (un-
published pamphlet.) Performances are characterized as theme, background, cue or bridge, jingle and
feature performances.
Points or "credits" are awarded based on the nature of each performance of an author's works. Feature
performances receive a full credit, and theme, background, jingle and cue performances receive fractional
credit values. Different credit values are awarded for repeat performances of the same work on a single pro-
gram depending on the nature of the use. Similarly, additional credit value is awarded for works with an ex-
tensive performance history. With television, the time of day of the broadcast also is considered in determin-
ing credit values. SHEMEL & KRAsILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 168-70; How the ASCAP Surve Works-A Basic
Primer, ASCAP Today, Fall 1976, at 26. Revenues are distributed quarterly to writer and publisher groups.
Credit values are then used to determine the percentage received by individual members of each group.
The survey utilized by ASCAP to determine fee payments involves extensive taping of a representative
sample of actual broadcasts. The sample is then used to estimate total national performances of each
author's works. Nonlicensed users are also surveyed to police for infringement.
Monitoring nonbroadcast performances is more difficult. To accomplish this feat, ASCAP screens the
logs of wired music systems and checks programs of educational, symphony and concert performances.
Feature performances on radio and television are used as "proxies" for hotel, nightclub and bar use. How
the ASCAP Survqy Works-A Primer, ASCAP Today, Fall 1976, at 28.
13 "Nonexclusive" means the author is free to license his works directly to users. This condition was
imposed on ASCAP by the 1950Judgment. Prior to the 1950Judgment ASCAP received the exclusive right
to license the works of its members. 1950 Judgment, supra note 4. Although BMI does receive exclusive
licensing rights from its affiliates, the 1966 Decree prohibits it from denying its members direct licensing
privileges upon request. 1966 Decree, supra note 4.
14 "Nondramatic" or "small" rights are distinguished from "dramatic" or "grand" rights. The
distinction, however, is sometimes less than clear. Nondramatic rights have been referred to as "renditions
of a song . . . without dialogue, scenery or costumes." Finklestein, The Composer and the Public In-
terest-Regulation of Performing Rights Societies, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 275, 283 n.32 (1954). The definition
has been criticized as being both too broad and too narrow. See3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 10.10 [El (1979).
Thus, it was held that the performance of 20 of 23 musical compositions from Jesus Christ Superstar in the
same sequence (with one exception) as they occurred-in the rock opera was a dramatic performance, the lack
of scenery, costumes and dialogue notwithstanding. The Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. Sperber, 457
F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1972). In that case the court found the sequence to be sufficient to tell the story of the opera.
Conversely, the presence of scenery, costumes, and dialogue should not automatically render a perfor-
mance dramatic. ASCAP has taken this position with respect to television performances, at least for the pur-
pose of defining dramatic rights within the context of its agreements with authors. The agreement recites:
For the purposes of this agreement, a dramatic performance shall mean a performance of a
musical composition on a television program in which there is a definite plot depicted by action
and where the performance of the musical composition is woven into and carries forward the plot
and its accompanying action. The use of dialogue to establish a mere program format or the use
of any nondramatic device merely to introduce a performance of a composition shall not be deem-
ed to make such performance dramatic.
1976-1985 Agreement Between Authors and ASCAP, 1(d)(ii) (1980) (available from ASCAP, I Lincoln
Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10023).
Perhaps a more workable standard is found in the following test: "Delete the proposed musical perfor-
mance from the production (be it stage, motion picture or television); if after such deletion the continuity or
story line of the production is in no way impeded or obscured, then the proposed performance is non-
dramatic-otherwise it is dramatic." 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT S 10.10 [E] (1979) (citing R. Monta of
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer as the author of the test).
15 As ofJanuary 1976 BMI's membership included 29,000 writers and over 15,000 publishers. It re-
mains, however, wholly owned by 480 broadcasters. BMI affiliates enter into two-year automatically
renewable contracts with the society. Like ASCAP, BMI membership criteria are subject to judicial
scrutiny. The 1966 Decree requires that an author have written a musical work which has either been com-
mercially published or recorded or is "otherwise likely to be performed." 1966 Decree, supra note 4.
Unlike ASCAP, BMI members have no control over the management of the society. BMI stockholders
elect the Board of Directors, none of whom is a writer or publisher.
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tempt to increase the broadcasting industry's bargaining power with ASCAP. 16
Today ASCAP and BMI remain the two leading performing rights societies in
the United States, 17 although several small privately owned organizations ex-
ist. 18
The utility of a performing rights society is that it is a convenient medium
for broadcasters and writers to become acquainted. Basically, a performing
rights society performs five functions: 1) licensing the right to perform publicly
copyrighted musical compositions in its repertory; 2) negotiating and collect-
ing fees generated by the licenses it issues; 3) surveying the frequency and
nature of licensee performances; 4) distributing fees collected from licensees to
authors and publishers; and 5) policing for infringements and prosecuting
when necessary in the name of members.1 9 The primary vehicles employed by
performing rights societies in exercising these functions are the "blanket" and
the "per program" licenses. It is the use of these licensing schemes that has
been the target of antitrust challenges. Accordingly, both marketing devices
must be explored in detail.
20
A. The Blanket License
A blanket license entitles a broadcaster to use the entire repertory of the is-
suing society for the duration of the license.21 The licenses are generally issued
annually. Fees are usually based on a fixed percentage of total advertising
revenues received during the period covered by the license.2 2 The fee does not
reflect actual usage of the copyrighted works. Furthermore, licenses for select
compositions are not available from the society, but must be obtained directly
from the writer.
2 3
The major advantage of the blanket license is that it gives a user access to
the entire catalogue of the performing rights society in a single transaction. Con-
BMI's fee schedule is similar to that of ASCAP. Broadcasters are charged at the rate of two percent of
adjusted gross receipts. Its adjustment formula, however, is such that users of both ASCAP and BMI works
generally pay one third less to BMI. SHEMEL & KRAStLOVSKY, supra note 11, at 163.
A predetermined rate schedule is utilized by BMI in distributing royalties. Fixed monetary values are
set for each type of performance (e.g., 2 Y2 cents for each AM radio feature performance for stations paying
less than $1,000 in license fees; 4 cents if it pays more). Credit values are then assessed depending on the
nature of the performance. "Multiple credits" are allotted for certain works including compositions
originating in Broadway shows with an original cast album, and those compositions with over one million
logged feature performances while in the BMI repertory. Contrary to ASCAP's system whereby all
members are treated identically regardless of their commercial success, BMI members are afforded in-
creased earnings once their cumulative performances reach a specified level. Id. at 171-73.
16 Id. at 163.
17 In 1975 ASCAP collected over $85 million in performance fees, while BMI's collections approx-
imated $52 '/ million. Id. at 162. ASCAP claims that no fees were collected prior to its birth in 1914. See R.
BROWN, KAPLAN & BROWN'S CASES ON COPYRIGHT 388 n.d (3rd ed. 1978).
18 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS 8.19 (1979). Of these SESAC, formerly known as the Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers, is the most significant. In 1975 it collected approximately $2 Y2 million in
fees. SESAC differs from ASCAP and BMI in that 50 percent of its collections are paid to its writer and
publisher members after deducting overhead costs, with SESAC retaining the remainder. SHEMEL &
KRAslLovsKY, supra note 11, at 162-64.
19 Comment, CBS v. ASCAP: Who Calls the Tune? Performing Rights Societies and the Rule Against Price Fix-
ing, 31 RUT. L. REV. 720, 725-26 (1978).
20 All future references to ASCAP will include BMI unless indicated otherwise.
21 See generally S. ROTHENBERO, supra note 10, at 30.
22 See note 12 supra.
23 400 F. Supp. at 759-60.
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sequently, transactional costs are reduced. 24 From the writer's perspective, the
benefits of the blanket license are twofold: 1) the costs of getting his composi-
tions to users are reduced and 2) the problem of policing for infringement is
reduced. The cost of disseminating information regarding a single composition
to the multitude of potential users would be tremendous. The collection of fees
from all users could prove costly as well. Additionally, efforts to curb infringe-
ment are enhanced since attention need only be focused on nonlicensees.
25
B. The Per Program License
Pursuant to the 1950Judgment 26 ASCAP is compelled to offer a "per pro-
gram" license to supplement the blanket license. In reality the per program
license is a variation of the blanket license. The user still has access to the entire
repertory of the issuing society. The critical difference between the two lies in
the fee structure. The fee percentage for a per program license is higher than
that paid for a blanket license. 27 The percentage, however, is applied to only
total advertising revenues generated by programs using ASCAP music.
2 8
It is these two licensing schemes that thrust performing rights societies into
the judicial arena. Indeed, blanket licensing has been the focus of a con-
tinuing saga of litigation under the antitrust laws that has lasted for over forty
years and still remains unsolved. The targets of this litigation, both govern-
mental and private, have been ASCAP and BMI.
III. ASCAP and BMI: No Strangers in Antitrust Litigation
A. The Consent Decrees
In 1934 the Department of Justice filed a criminal complaint against
ASCAP alleging antitrust violations.2 9 The case never reached a verdict,
however, because the government failed to prosecute the matter following a
midtrial continuance. In 1941 the Department ofJustice resumed its attack. In
separate complaints the government charged that the blanket licenses offered
24 Transaction costs are reduced since users need only contact the society concerning prices and licens-
ing terms. The enormity of the monetary and time savings is apparent given that a single radio station may
broadcast in excess of 60,000 performances involving over 6,000 copyrighted musical works in a single year.
Note, CBS v. ASCAP: Performing Rights Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J. 783, 786 (1978). Contacting
each writer and negotiating terms would be impossible. ASCAP estimates that there are hundreds of
millions of performances of works in its repertory each year. How the ASCAP Survey Works-A Basic Primer,
ASCAP Today, Fall 1976, at 26. Licensees include: 1) approximately 7,700 broadcasters; 2) wired music
systems such as Muzak; 3) symphony, concert and/or educational operations; 4) hotels, nightclubs, bars;
and over 5,000 other users including airlines and football stadia. Id.
25 ASCAP conducts a survey of licensee and nonlicensee radio and television broadcasts. The former is
used for the purpose of calculating fees. The latter is used to police for pirating. If unlicensed uses are
detected, ASCAP institutes infringement actions on behalf of its members. 400 F. Supp. at 742. Seegenerally
SHEMEL & KRASILOVSKY, supra note 11, at 165-66.
26 1950 Judgment, supra note 4.
27 S. ROTHENBERG, supra note 10, at 32.
28 Id. The 1950 Judgment requires that the terms and fees of the blanket and per program licenses offer
a genuine economic choice. Moreover, ASCAP is prohibited from requiring or influencing prospective
licensees to seek blanket licenses before per program licenses. 1950 Judgment, supra note 4.
The per program license is valuable to those broadcasters, particularly some radio stations, that use
music only in a small portion of their shows. It has not been widely employed by the major television net-
works. 562 F.2d at 134 n.9.
29 Cohen, Music, Radio Broadcasting and the Sherman Act, 29 Gao. L. J. 407, 424 n.91 (1941).
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by ASCAP and BMI were illegal restraints of trade and imposed arbitrary
prices through unlawful copyright pools. The government requested the court
to enjoin ASCAP's then exclusive30 licensing arrangement with authors and
composers, and require an alternative form of licensing from ASCAP and
BMI. Neither case was prosecuted to a verdict since both the ASCAP and BMI
cases culminated in antitrust consent decrees.
31
The initial ASCAP decree was entered into in 1941, one week after the
government filed the complaint. The decree was substantially amended in
1950, and has been subjected to minor amendment subsequently. The key pro-
visions of the amended decree include: 1) automatic issuance of a license to a
user upon request; 2) opportunity for users to initiate proceedings in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York for the determination of a
reasonable fee if a user objects to the one proposed by ASCAP, with ASCAP
having the burden of proving reasonableness; 3) the availability of a per pro-
gram license for broadcasters; 4) a prohibition against acquiring other than
nonexclusive rights from its members; and 5) a prohibition against discrimina-
tion in licensing terms to users similarly situated.
32
The BMI consent decree was also entered into in 1941. This decree was
replaced by an amended decree in 1966. 3 3 The conditions it imposes are similar
to those restricting ASCAP's operations. The two decrees do, however, vary in
some respects. BMI is not restricted to obtaining nonexclusive rights from its
affiliates.3 4 Additionally, the 1966 Decree does not include a provision
authorizing judicial fee setting.
3 5
The provisions of the consent decrees and the conditions they impose on
the operations of ASCAP and BMI have played significant roles in later
assaults on blanket licensing. Indeed, these provisions have been the focal
point of judicial scrutiny in subsequent litigation, often providing immunity
from antitrust condemnation.
B. K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp.:
A Frontal Assault on Blanket Licensing
Ii K-91 Inc. V. Gershwin Publishing Corp. 36 several ASCAP members sued a
30 441 U.S. at 10-11.
31 Id. at 12 n.20. See note 4 supra.
32 See 1941 Decree and 1950Judgment, supra note 4. See generally Garner, United States v. ASCAP: The
Licensing Provisions of the Amended Final Judgment, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 119, 120-27 (1976). The 1950
Judgment as amended does not require ASCAP to license the use of individual works in its repertory unless
requested to do so by both the author and user. 1950 Judgment, supra note 4. When the National Broad-
casting Company (NBC) sought a license for 2,217 compositions in the ASCAP repertory frequently used
on NBC variety shows, the district court in New York ruled that it would not be appropriate to let a non-
party (NBC) obtain what in effect would be a modification of the ASCAP consent decree. Further, it inter-
preted section VI of the 1950 Judgment as not requiring ASCAP to function as an intermediary between
users and individual ASCAP members. United States v. ASCAP (In re Application of National Broad-
casting Co.) [1971] Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Significantly, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has never been called upon to
establish a reasonable fee. It has, however, served as a mediator between ASCAP and users. Garner, supra
note 32, at 127-28.
33 1966 Decree, supra note 4.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
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Seattle radio broadcaster for copyright infringement. The defendant admitted
the infringement, but asserted as a defense that ASCAP was an unlawful com-
bination for the purpose' of price-fixing and block-booking its members' com-
positions in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.3 7 The Ninth Cir-
cuit responded by affirming the trial court's finding that ASCAP had not
violated the antitrust laws since there was no assertion that ASCAP was not in
compliance with the amended 1950 Judgment. 38 Further, the court averred
that ASCAP could not be accused of price-fixing since every licensee had access
to the district court to establish a reasonable fee whenever it felt ASCAP's
terms unreasonable. The appellate court concluded that as long as ASCAP
complied with the decree, it could not be price-fixing. The court labeled the
decree as having "disinfected" ASCAP as a combination in restraint of
trade. 39 Moreover, the court reasoned, the nonexclusive nature of ASCAP's
licensing authority precluded ASCAP from falling within antitrust
prohibition.
40
Significantly, before denying certiorari 41 in K-91 the Supreme Court in-
vited the Solicitor General to file an amicus brief expressing the views of the
government as to the legality of ASCAP's operations.4 2 While the Solicitor
General's sanction of the Ninth Circuit's 43 holding in K-91 certainly weighed
heavily in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, it proved to be extremely
important in subsequent attacks on blanket licensing, particularly in the CBS
litigation.
C. CBS v. ASCAP4 4: You've Lost That Lovin Feelin
"4 5
1. The District Court: We've Only Just Begun
46
ASCAP and CBS have engaged in licensing agreements since 1929.
4 7
During this period, CBS had acquired only blanket licenses, never having
37 15 U.S.C. §5 1 and 2 (1976). Section 1 provides in part that "[e]very contract, combination.., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is declared illegal."
Section 2 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony .
38 372 F.2d at 2-3.
39 Id. at 4. This conclusion is inconsistent with the court's earlier statement that "we do not reach the
question of whether activities which would otherwise be a violation of the antitrust laws could be rendered
immune because consistent with the terms of the consent decree."Id.
40 Id.
41 389 U.S. 1045 (1968).
42 389 U.S. 805 (1967).
43 See generally Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., No.
147, December, 1967 (hereinafter cited as Memorandum for the United States). The Solicitor General en-
dorsed the Ninth Circuit's decision with the exception of the "disinfected" theory. The government
disavowed any assertion that the 1950Judgment would render lawful any conduct otherwise prohibited by
the antitrust laws. Id. at 7. Earlier litigation had endorsed this position. See United States v. ASCAP (Ap-
plication of Shenandoah Valley Broadcasting, Inc.), 331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997
(1964).
44 400 F. Supp. 737 (1975). Earlier ASCAP's motion for summary judgment was denied. 337 F. Supp.
394 (1972).
45 Words and music by Phil Spector, Barry Mann and Cynthia Weil. Copyrighted 1964 by Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc.
46 Words by Paul Williams; music by Rodger Nichols. Copyrighted 1970 by Irving Music, Inc..
47 400 F. Supp. at 753.
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elected to obtain a per program license. In April, 1969, CBS and ASCAP sub-
mitted for court approval agreements as to license fees for CBS's television net-
work fo 1969 and several prior years. Because the proposed fees would in-
crease the disparity between CBS fees paid to ASCAP and BMI, BMI
demanded an increase to maintain some semblance of parity. When negotia-
tions for higher fees proved unproductive, BMI notified CBS that it would ter-
minate CBS's license.
48
CBS responded by requesting both BMI and ASCAP to submit licenses
effective January 1, 1970, that would provide for payment on the basis of ac-
tual usage of each society's music. When neither ASCAP nor BMI accom-
modated CBS's request, CBS filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
49
CBS's complaint contained four allegations of antitrust violations and an
allegation of copyright misuse. CBS averred that ASCAP and BMI were
vehicles by which the members of both organizations engaged in price-fixing,
unlawful tying arrangements, group boycotts, and monopolization, both at-
tempted and achieved.5 0 Also, CBS contended that the copyrights of the "n-
dividual members of both organizations were the means by which the members
restrained competition and, therefore, the activities of the defendants con-
stituted copyright misuse. For relief, CBS sought an injunction under section
16 of the Clayton Act,5 1 requiring both performing rights societies to offer
licenses on terms that reflected the nature and amount of CBS's actual use of
music. 52 Alternatively, CBS sought to enjoin both BMI and ASCAP from of-
fering blanket licenses to any television network.
5 3
The defendants responded by moving for summary judgment, contending
that K-91 was controlling.5 4 Judge Lasker, in denying the motion, noted that
K-91 and CBS were not analogous. Initially he pointed out that ASCAP was
not insulated from antitrust violations by the consent decree provision granting
the district court authority to set a reasonable fee. The court acknowledged that
a "reasonable price" does not necessarily equate with a "competitive price.'
55
48 Id.
49 Herman Finklestein, general counsel to ASCAP, replied that ASCAP would consider CBS's pro-
posal at the next meeting of its board of directors on January 29, 1970. CBS's request was viewed as an ap-
plication for a license pursuant to the consent decree. Further, CBS was instructed that a 60-day interim
license would be issued with rates and terms to be negotiated and set by the court. Id.
BMI made a similar response, directing CBS to the provisions of its consent decree and the licensing
alternatives provided therein. Id.
50 Id. at 745.
51 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
52 As an alternative to the blanket license, CBS suggested a "per use" license. Under this system,
ASCAP and BMI would continue in their clearinghouse roles. The payment of fees, however, would be con-
tingent upon the performance of a composition in the "per use reservoir." The fee for each use would be set
in a schedule. The actual amount would be a function of the nature of the use (theme, background or
feature) and other factors including duration of use and the popularity of the particular composition. 400 F.
Supp. at 747 n.7.
53 Id. at 741. CBS also sought a declaratory judgment of copyright misuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS
2201, 2202 (1976).
54 337 F. Supp. 394 (1972). In K-91 the same antitrust violations asserted by CBS were rejected by the
Ninth Circuit. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
55 337 F. Supp. at 397-98 n.2. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) the
Supreme Court held that the reasonableness of a fixed price would not validate the price-fixing practice. Id.
at 397. In ASCAP's case, a price-fixing allegation following a court-established fee would present theoretical
problems since ASCAP would no longer be the "price-fixing" entity. Consequently, a price-fixing
challenge to ASCAP's operations under the 1950Judgment would appear to attack the legality of the decree
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Further, the court reasoned, in K-91 no practical alternative to blanket licens-
ing had been proposed as in CBS. Indeed, in K-91 the parties had stipulated
that no practical alternatives to blanket licensing were available. 56 Thus, CBS
was readily distinguishable since CBS's position was to the contrary; it pro-
posed a "per use" license as an alternative.
57
Although Judge Lasker denied ASCAP's motion for summary judgment
by distinguishing K-91, he did not give substantial weight to the government's
position in that case. Rejecting a per se test and mandating a rule of reason stan-
dard, he endorsed the Solicitor General's position that market realities in the
music publishing business were such that conduct that would otherwise be con-
demned would be tolerated to preserve an orderly market. 58 Such conduct,
however, would be tolerated only to the "minimum extent" necessary to effect
an orderly market. 59 Accordingly, the judge ruled that notwithstanding the
1950Judgment, ASCAP's operations would fall under a rule of reason analysis
if they transcended the minimum restraints necessary. He framed the issue in
terms of whether the 1950 Judgment constituted "an implied partial repeal of
the antitrust laws." 60 Presumably, if CBS could establish the viability of a "per
use" license, the blanket license would fail under the "minimum extent"
criterion.
The denial of ASCAP's motion for summary judgment was followed by
an eight-week trial which culminated in the dismissal of CBS's complaint.
61
Despite Judge Lasker's earlier ruling that a rule of reason standard was to be
applied to ASCAP and BMI, CBS persisted in its contention that both had
engaged in per se violations of the Sherman Act. 62 CBS relied principally on
rather than ASCAP's operations. CBS appears to have been cognizant of this dilemma since it asserted that
ASCAP's operations under the 1950Judgmient constituted the antitrust violation. 337 F. Supp. at 397.
56 Id. at 400.
57 See note 52 supra. The feasibility of the per use system raised a material question of fact, thus
precluding summary judgment. 337 F. Supp. at 401.
58 Id. at 398, 400.
59 Judge Lasker relied on a Supreme Court decision dealing with the immunity of the New York Stock
Exchange under the antitrust statutes. The Court held that the Exchange was immune only to "the
minimum extent necessary" to make the Securities Exchange Act work. Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). Judge Lasker analogized the Securities Exchange Act to the 1950Judg-
ment.
60 337 F. Supp. at 400. Judge Lasker's conclusion was an express rejection of the Ninth Circuit's view
that the 1950 Judgment "disinfected" ASCAP's operations so as to provide complete antitrust immunity.
Whether the 1950 Judgment could create absolute immunity or even a partial repeal of the antitrust
laws is dubious. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Artists Mgt., Inc., [1963] Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,955
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'dper curiam, 381 U.S. 348 (1965).
61 400 F. Supp. 737 (1975).
62 The per se violation referred principally to the allegation of price-fixing. Price-fixing was first con-
demned as a per se violation of the Sherman Act in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392
(1927). In that case the Court rejected a reasonableness standard for conduct categorized as price-fixing on
four grounds: first, price-fixing inevitably results in the elimination of competition; second, the power to fix
prices, whether reasonable or not, includes the power to control the market and ultimately, to fix
unreasonable prices; third, a fixed price, even if presently reasonable, can become unreasonable with
economic fluctuation; and fourth, courts do not have the facilities to undertake the task of determining
reasonable prices for each and every industry in a changing economy. Id. at 397-98.
Thus, once conduct is characterized as price-fixing thejudicial inquiry terminates. Economic justifica-
tion for the practice is ignored. Modern courts havejustified the per se approach for activities such as price-
fixing under the rationale that the economic benefits of the practice are far outweighed by thejudicial expe-
diency gained by circumventing a rule of reason analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405
U.S. 596, 607-10 (1972); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 55:729] NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. 63 for support. In that case the
Supreme Court held that any horizontal agreement among competitors that
"tampers with price structures" is unlawful per se.
64
The district court rejected this characterization of ASCAP's activities,
noting that Socony-Vacuum was inappropriate since there was no assertion that
individual members of ASCAP agreed among themselves as to license fees to
be charged for compositions offered by each of them. 65 Further, the court ruled
that the claim that a combination of individual sellers offering the entire pool of
their works "through a common sales agent at a negotiated package price is per
se illegal ... fails as a matter of law." 66 To support its ruling the district court
cited Automatic Radio Co., Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 67 which held that
licenses for the use of any or all patents held by Hazeltine were not per se patent
misuse. The court also relied on Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 68
in which patent misuse was found under a licensing arrangement that com-
pelled the licensee to choose between a license requiring the payment of
royalties on products not using the patent or no license at all. In the latter case,
the court noted, illegality was premised on the presence of coercion; the
licensee either accepted the terms of the license or did without the underlying
product.69
Coercion was conspicuously absent in CBS. As Judge Lasker indicated,
the blanket license was only one of several options open to CBS. The per pro-
gram license, which under the 1950 Judgment had to offer a genuine economic
choice, provided for fees based only upon programs using the societies'
music. 70 Also, the requirement that ASCAP acquire only nonexclusive rights
preserved direct licensing as another option.7"
Given these circumstances, Judge Lasker dismissed CBS's complaint.
7 2
Hardly terminating the issue, Judge Lasker's decision marked the beginning of
a judicial nightmare that yet remains unresolved.
2. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals: Bridge Over Troubled Water"
The district court's conclusion that blanket licensing did not constitute an
illegal tying arrangement was upheld on appeal. 74 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, however, rejected the district court's finding that the activities of
63 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
64 Id. at 221. The Court stated that any combination "formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing . . . price . . . is illegal per se." Id. at 223.
65 400 F. Supp. at 748.
66 Id.
67 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
68 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
69 400 F. Supp. at 749.
70 Id. at 749. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
71 400 F. Supp. at 749. Judge Lasker's emphasis of the need for coercion suggests that he was treating
the case as essentially a tie-in or blocking claim. See 562 F.2d at 134. The district court also found that CBS
could create the necessary machinery for direct licensing during a "reasonable planning period." 400 F.
Supp. at 765, 781-83. Further, the court found that authors would not be "disinclined" to negotiate directly
with CBS, but rather would line up at CBS's door. Id. at 765-67.
72 Id. at 783.
73 Words and music by Paul Simon. Copyright 1969 by Paul Simon.
74 562 F.2d at 135. The Second Circuit's finding was predicated on the district court's conclusion that a
viable alternative to blanket licensing existed and thereby precluded coercion. Id. at 134-35.
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ASCAP and BMI were not price-fixing. Judge Gurfein focused on CBS's con-
tention that the pooling of copyrights for their collective sale by a single agency
at a single price restrained competiton among authors. 75 Within this structure
the court found price-fixing. The court stated that the "determination of how
much each copyright owner gets from the common pot is an artificial fixing of
the price to that member of the combination for his composition.' '76 Indeed,
the royalty paid to an individual was said to be the product of "at least the
threshold elimination of price competition for the performing rights in his own
particular composition.'77
Recognizing that the characterization of blanket licensing as price-fixing
would result in a per se condemnation of the practice, the court noted that price-
fixing was sometimes tolerated under a "market-functioning exception."
78
This exception had received the endorsement of the Solicitor General in K-91
as being applicable to the performing rights market. 79 Application of the doc-
trine in CBS, however, proved difficult in light of the haunting stipulation pres-
ent in K-91.80
A dichotomy existed in CBS if the market-functioning exception was to be
applied, given the district court's finding that direct licensing existed as a prac-
tical alternative to the blanket license. 81 If direct licensing was available as a
practical alternative to blanket licensing so as to preclude coercion and,
therefore, the presence of an illegal tie-in, blanket licensing could not be sus-
tained under the market-functioning exception. That the market could func-
tion without blanket licensing, which is what the district court's ruling
necessarily implied, refuted a market necessity assertion since direct licensing
assured the existence of a market in the absence of blanket licensing. Conse-
quently, that which disproved one antitrust violation, the tie-in charge,
precluded the availability of a defense to the price-fixing allegation.
82
Other defenses to the price-fixing characterization were also rejected by
the court. 83 Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of CBS's
complaint. 84 However, rather than imposing an injunction as normally would
75 Id. at 136.
76 Id. The court found this conduct to be "tampering with price structures" within the meaning of
Socony-Vacuum. See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
77 562 F.2d at 136.
78 Id. The court described the concept as holding that price-fixing is per se illegal unless it is absolutely
necessary for the market to function at all. Id.
79 Memorandum for the United States, supra note 43, at 10-11.
80 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
81 See note 71 supra.
82 The court held that blanket licensing for television networks could not be saved by the "market necessi-
ty defense." 562 F.2d at 140. Consequently, the Ninth. Circuit's holding in K-91, which upheld blanket
licensing in the radio broadcasting industry was not, technically, in conflict with the court's ruling. The validi-
ty of the distinction in the two holdings was conditioned upon the presence of the K-91 stipulation that no
practical alternative to blanket licensing existed in the radio broadcasting industry. If a per use license could
be designed for that market or the feasibility of direct licensing established, the issues raised in CBS would
surface. See text accompanying notes 126-29 infra.
83 The court rejected the arguments that the consent decrees "disinfected" the activities of ASCAP and
BMI, and that the blanket license was not a price-fixing mechanism. In addressing the latter, the court
disavowed the assertion that the blanket license and licenses for individual compositions were so fundamen-
tally different that a claim of price-fixing was impossible. The court reasoned that the mere existence of the
blanket license enabled a copyright owner "to choose the blanket license as his medium of licensing ... and
therefore dulls his incentive to compete." 562 F.2d at 139.
84 CBS contended that the mere presence of the blanket license would taint prices for direct licensing ar-
rangements. Citing the district court's finding to the contrary and CBS's substantial bargaining power in
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be done after a finding of price-fixing, the court remanded the case to the
district court to fashion a remedy which would insulate the effects of the blanket
license on prices and negotiations for direct licenses. 85 Noting that blanket
licenses are not "naked restraint[s] 86 ineluctably doomed to extinction," but
often serve valid market needs, the court proffered a possible remedy: a per use
license that would ensure competition among individual members.
87
3. Supreme Court: Is That All There Is?8
Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court sought to untangle the
copyright-antitrust snarl. 89 After rehashing the complex background data that
are necessary to understand the milieu in which blanket licensing functions, the
Court attacked the Second Circuit's condemnation of blanket licensing. At the
outset the Court recognized that agreements among competitors to fix price
have been traditionally placed in the per se category. But, as the Court stated,
"easy labels do not always supply ready answers." 90
Justice White, writing for the Court, questioned the Second Circuit's
literal approach to the price-fixing issue, labeling it as "overly simplistic" and
"overbroad." 91 Hence, the Court embarked on a critical analysis of blanket
licensing.
The Court considered the extensive judicial and executive scrutiny to
which blanket licensing had been subjected. Justice White noted that the
Department ofJustice had endorsed the Ninth Circuit's sanctioning of blanket
licensing in K-91. 92 Additionally, the substantial restrictions imposed on
ASCAP and BMI by the consent decrees provided further support that the
blanket license was not a mere naked restraint. 93 Moreover, the Court pointed
out that Congress had recognized the utility of blanket licenses in the
Copyright Act of 1976 by adopting it as the means to license secondary
transmissions by cable television94 and the use of copyrighted compositions in
jukeboxes.
95
Next the Court focused on the unique market conditions in which the
blanket license prevailed. Since Congress, by enacting copyright protection,
created the line of commerce which blanket licensing allegedly restrained, the
the market, the court rejected CBS's claim. Id. at 140 n.27. This finding appears to be at odds with the Se-
cond Circuit's institutions to the district court: fashion a remedy "which will ensure that the blanket license
will not affect the price or negotiations for direct licenses." Id. at 140.
85 Id. at 141.
86 Id. at 140.
87 The Second Circuit's decision stimulated substantial commentary. See Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP: An
Economic Analysis of a Political Problem, 47 FORDHAM L. Rav. 277 (1978); Note, Copyright andAntitrust-A New
Amended Judgment for ASCAP and BMI? CBS v. ASCAP Remanded, 8 MEM. ST. L. Rav. 821 (1978); Note,
Antitrust- Tie-ins-Price-fixing, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 563; Note, supra note 24; Comment, CBS v. ASCAP, 6
HOFSTRA L. REv. 445 (1978); Comment, supra note 12; Comment, supra note 19.
88 Words by Jerry Leiber; music by Mike Stroller.
89 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
90 Id. at 8.
91 Id. at 9. The Court also rejected CBS's position that the payment of a flat fee regardless of the
amount of actual usage of ASCAP music was sufficient to sustain an antitrust violation or copyright misuse.
Id. at 8 n.13.
92 Id. at 15. See notes 36-43 and accompanying text supra.
93 441 U.S. at 11-13.
94 17 U.S.C. 1(d)(5)(A) (1976).
95 17 U.S.C. 116(c)(4) (1976).
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Court reasoned that "any market arrangements reasonably necessary to effec-
tuate" 96 those rights could hardly be deemed a per se violation. In a market
composed of "thousands of users, thousands of copyright owners and millions
of compositions,' 9 7 all demanding coordination and monitoring, the blanket
license could not be characterized as a "naked restrain[t] of trade with no pur-
pose except stifling ... competition. "98
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's per se
finding99 and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for a determination of
whether CBS had preserved the assessment of blanket licensing under a rule of
reason standard. 100 The Second Circuit subsequently upheld CBS's challenge
under a rule of reason test by denying BMI's motion for summary judgment on
remanded.101
IV. Blanket Licensing: Where Does It Stand?
The Supreme Court's decision supplies more questions than answers. The
holding that blanket licensing to television networks was not aper se violation of
the antitrust laws did not resolve the per se issue completely.1 0 2 In fact, suits
already have been filed challenging blanket licensing to local television stations
under the per se rule. 103 Moreover, the legality of blanket licensing under a rule
of reason test is in question. 0 1 Accordingly, it must be evaluated in light of
both standards.
96 400 U.S. at 19.
97 Id. at 20. ASCAP has over 3 million songs in its repertory; BMI has over I million. 400 F. Supp. at
742.
98 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
99 Id. at 24. The Second Circuit found copyright misuse on the basis of the antitrust violation. 562 F.2d
at 141 n.29. Since the misuse was contingent upon the antitrust violation, that portion of the Second Cir-
cuit's judgment was also reversed. 441 U.S. at 24.
100 Id. at 25 n.44.
101 607 F.2d at 544. BMI maintained that CBS had not preserved the rule of reason issue and moved for
summary judgment on remand. The Second Circuit gave four reasons for its ruling: 1) Justice White stated
that the blanket license should be subjected to a "more discriminating examination under the rule of
reason" (citing 441 U.S. at 24); 2)Justice Stevens in his dissent evaluated blanket licensing under the rule of
reason and found it to be an unreasonable restraint (citing 441 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); 3) the
Department ofJustice in its amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court took no position on the status of blanket
licensing under a rule of reason standard (citing 441 U.S. at 15); and 4) the Second Circuit had rejected the
market necessity defense in dealing with television networks. Id.
102 See Hartnick, From Black to White-A Comment on Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 27 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 7 (1979).
103 See, e.g., Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, No. 78-5670 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 27, 1978).
104 The rule of reason was initially established as the standard of evaluation under the Sherman Act in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Seven years laterjustice White clarified the standard
in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). There the Court stated that a restraint
which "merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition" as opposed to one which "may sup-
press or even destroy competition" can be tolerated under the reasonableness standard. Id. at 238-. The
Court also elaborated on what factors should be considered in a reasonableness inquiry:
To determine that question [reasonableness] the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. This remains the classic statement of the rule of reason test. Recently the Court rearticulated the relevant
inquiry as one that "focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions." Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). The Court ultimately,
however, restated the Chicago Board of Trade rule: "whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes
competition or one that suppresses competition." Id. at 691.
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A. Blanket Licensing and the Per Se Rule
1. Price-Fixing
The Second Circuit's conclusion that the blanket license involves price-
fixing is vulnerable, as was pointed out by the Supreme Court. The weakness
in the Second Circuit's finding is revealed by focusing on the activity that was
branded price-fixing. The court stated:
The charge that there is a restraint of trade by price-fixing is founded
upon the conception that when any group of sellers or licensors continues to
sell their products through a single agency with a single price, competition on
price by the individual sellers has been restrained .... But even if the single
price is reasonable, the determination of how much each copyright owner gets from the
common pot is an artificial fixing of the price to that member of the combination for his
composition. *His distributive share of the common royalties may be greater
than the royalty he would receive in a free market.
10 5
CBS had charged that price-fixing occurred in the sale of a blanket license en-
titling the user to perform the entire repertory of the issuing society for a single
fee. The beginning of the above passage acknowledges this fact. The court's
finding of price-fixing, however, was not associated with that conduct, but
rather with the ultimate distribution of the fees. Consequently, the "price"
that the Second Circuit found to be "fixed" was not what the buyers paid, but
what the sellers received. This finding strains common notions of price.
1 0 6
The amount received by individual authors from the ASCAP royalty pool
is not fixed. The amount is a function of the nature of the use (theme,
background, cue, or feature), the quantity of use, the popularity of the work
and the length of the author's membership in the society.' 0 7 The only variable
that is fixed is the credit formula which incorporates these factors in
distributing the fees.
The Second Circuit's attenuated argument results from ASCAP's conduct
not clearly equating with that found in prior price-fixing cases, upon which
both CBS and the court relied.108 The classic price-fixing cartel involves a
105 562 F.2d at 136 (emphasis added).
106 There is some support for this position in older case law. In Federal Trade Commission v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) the Court used the amount received by sellers as the relevant price for the
purpose of sustaining a price discrimination charge under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 721-26. Application of the concept to a price-fixing charge, however, is
dubious since in the same case the Court used the amount buyers paid as the price to find an unfair method
of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. Numerous price-fixing cases were
cited in support of the Court's conclusion on the issue. Id. at 690-93. Further, the FTC abandoned this no-
tion of price under the Robinson-Patman Act in the early 1950's. S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: CASES AND COMMENTS 810-15 (3rd ed. 1974).
107 See note 12 supra.
108 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). All of these cases involved classic price-fixing cartels.
The Second Circuit also relied on two patent pooling cases, United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342
U.S. 371 (1952) and United States v. Line Material Co., 33 U.S. 287 (1948). 562 F.2d at 136. These cases
are not analogous for the same reason; ASCAP members do not agree to illegal activity and then implement
it in their individual capacities.
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group of competitors engaging in a conspiracy to each sell the sameproduct at the
same price. ASCAP and BMI do not reflect such a scheme. Members of per-
forming rights societies do not agree on license fees for their individual works;
rather, they authorize the society to negotiate fees for their aggregate works.10 9
The Supreme Court recognized this distinction, noting that the blanket
license is a different product from that offered by individual copyright
owners. 11 0 The blanket license possesses synergistic features for both users and
copyright owners. The licensee receives immediate access to the entire reper-
tory of the issuing society without the burden of individual negotiations. Fur-
ther, the user receives flexibility in the choice of music with immunity from in-
fringement suits. Conversely, composers receive policing services and access to
users at minimal costs. These factors led the Court to conclude that "ASCAP
is not really ajoint sales agency offering individual goods of many sellers, but is
a separate seller offering its blanket license of which the individual composi-
tions are raw material."
111
To support its price-fixing categorization the Second Circuit relied on
broad language found in Socony-Vacuum: "a combination which tampers with
price structures . . . engage[s] in an unlawful activity."' 1 2 Again, the price
structure to which the Second Circuit was referring was the payment received
by individual members. The court apparently was suggesting that the ASCAP
royalty distribution plan would influence direct licensing fees. This assertion,
however, is in direct conflict with a later finding of the court that the existence
of the blanket license would not taint direct licensing attempts.
1 3
Ironically, CBS, the party seeking to condemn blanket licensing as price-
fixing, proposed an alternative per use license that is more offensive to the an-
titrust laws than the current practice.11 4 Under CBS's proposal ASCAP would
license individual uses of its members' compositions. The fees, however, would
be fixed in schedules reflecting the nature of the use to which the music was
put-theme, background, or feature. The credit formulas currently used by
ASCAP and BMI would be used in distributing royalties.1
5
Clearly this system approaches, if not reaches, the conduct of classic price-
fixing cartels. CBS would pay the same price to writers and lyricists for the
same product as the result of an agreement. Consequently, a group of com-
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) most closely resembles the conduct in
CBS. In that case over 100 producers of coal established a joint selling agency to market their coal. The
agency set selling prices for coal and then allocated contracts to the members. The Supreme Court upheld
the practices of the agency in light of depressed market conditions due to overproduction, dumping and
pyramiding sales contracts.
Although this conduct is similar to that found in CBS, it can be distinguished. ASCAP does not
establish a license fee which individual members then adopt in licensing their compositions to users. Indeed,
such a practice is precisely what CBS proposed under its per use license. Upholding such a license by relying
on Appalachian Coals would be suspect, however, since Socony-Vacuum implicitly overruled the Appalachian
Coals economic justification rule for price-fixing. 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.
109 The Supreme Court acknowledged this point. 441 U.S. at 24 n.42 (citing 400 F. Supp. at 48).
110 Id. at 21-22.
111 Id. at 22.
112 562 F.2d at 136 (quoting 310 U.S. at 222).
113 See note 84 supra.
114 See note 52 supra.
115 400 F. Supp. at 763. This is precisely what the Second Circuit condemned as price-fixing.
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petitors would engage in a conspiracy to sell the same product at the same
price.116
As stated above, the difficulty with attacking ASCAP as a price-fixing
cartel is that it does not conveniently fit the conduct that has been traditionally
categorized as such. ASCAP's licensing scheme was not "formed for the pur-
pose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
... price."" 7 The difficulty results, in part, from the nature of antitrust law. It
is an evolutionary process. The per se rule itself is the outgrowth of repeated
scrutiny of certain conduct to the point that its anticompetitive effect can be
predicted as a certainty.11 8 Had blanket licensing been brought within the
penumbra of price-fixing in CBS, it would have marked one more step in the
broadening of that aspect of the per se concept. Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's rejection of the price-fixing label, blanket licensing could still receive
per se condemnation if the Court found it to be "plainly anticompetitive."
2. Blanket Licensing: Plainly Anticompetitive?
Price-fixing is not the only conduct vulnerable to per se categorization." t9
All practices and agreements void of economic virtue are "conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
1 20
Said another way, practices that are so "plainly anticompetitive" are deemed
"illegal per se." 112
Whether blanket licensing was sufficiently anticompetitive to warrant per
se classification was addressed by the Supreme Court in CBS. The Court made
clear, at least in the confines of television networks, that blanket licensing did
not have such an impact.
22
The difficulties of per se condemnation of blanket licensing are reflected in
the Second Circuit's resolution of the issue. Despite the court's finding that
blanket licensing violates per se standards, the court attempted to preserve
blanket licensing in coexistence with some form of per use licensing. 23 The
court recognized that blanket licenses served existing market needs for those
who seek infringement immunity at modest cost. This result, however,
116 See text accompanying notes 108-109 supra. The Supreme Court raised this issue as well. 441 U.S. at
17 n.27.
117 The Court characterized this conduct as price-fixing in Socony-Vacuum. 310 U.S. at 223.
118 Price-fixing provides a good example of the evolutionary process. Judicial scrutiny of the practice
began in 1897 in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) in which the
Court first held the practice to be in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211 (1899), aff'g, 85 F.2d 271 (6th Cir. 1898), the Court held that no inquiry into
the reasonableness of a fixed price was necessary. After vacillating in several cases as to the proper standard
to be applied to price-fixing, the Court enunciated the per se rule in United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273
U.S. 392 (1927). In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) the Court reasserted the
per se standard and attempted to establish the parameters of the conduct constituting price-fixing. See note
64 supra.
119 Other activities condemned under the per se rule include: horizontal customer, territorial and
geographic restraints, United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 506 (1972); concerted refusals to
deal, Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); and tying arrangements, International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
120 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
121 435 U.S. at 692.
122 441 U.S. at 24.
123 562 F.2d at 140.
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frustrates the per se rule. As the Supreme Court noted, "the per se rule does not
accommodate itself to such flexibility.' '124 The Second Circuit's resolution of
CBS was in reality a perversion of the rule of reason standard; it condemned
blanket licensing after a superficial analysis of its impact on competition and
failed to pinpoint the "plainly anticompetitive" effect, 125 but sought to
preserve the practice within limitations.
Moreover, rendering blanket licensing illegitimate for television networks
through the use of the per se rule raises serious questions as to its legality in
other markets. It is difficult to conceive of a practice that could be so plainly an-
ticompetitive when dealing with television networks and yet be maintained as
reasonable when dealing with radio broadcasting. 126 Harnessing the breadth of
per se illegality in this manner would violate existing notions of the rule.
Application of the per se rule would also create a licensing void. A per use
license issued through a performing rights society that would survive under the
antitrust statutes would be difficult to imagine in light of the per se illegality of
blanket licensing. 127 The Supreme Court recognized that blanket condemna-
tion of the practice would threaten the legality of any license issued through a
performing rights society.128 In light of the many benefits offered by perform-
ing rights societies, the Court found such a conclusion intolerable.
129
The most significant shortcoming in applying the per se rule to blanket
licensing in CBS was the absence of a plainly anticompetitive effect. The con-
sent decrees safeguarded against ASCAP and BMI using their copyright pools
to thwart competition. 130 While these hardly immunized ASCAP and BMI
from antitrust violations,' 31 they did suggest that the procompetitive and an-
ticompetitive effects of blanket licensing have been somewhat balanced so as to
maximize the former and minimize the latter." 2 Moreover, the district court's
finding that there are no real impediments to direct licensing 33 suggests that
any lack of competition was due, in part, to CBS's failure to exploit this alter-
native. 134
A lack of competition, however, is not descriptive of the market found by
the district court. Indeed, the district court characterized the market as one
that creates "Darwinian imagery of cutthroat competition among hungry
publishers and writers seeking network exposure.' ' 35 Consequently, the
124 441 U.S. at 17.
125 Id. at n.27.
126 The reasonableness of blanket licensing for radio broadcasters received the endorsement of both the
judiciary and Justice Department in K-91. 441 U.S. at 15. The Justice Department in its amicus brief in
CBS denounced the Second Circuit's per se classification, but took no position on the legality of blanket
licensing under a reasonableness standard. Id.
127 See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
128 441 U.S. at 17.
129 Significantly, Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in the Court's decision, also rejected a per se conclu-
sion. Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 See text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
131 441 U.S. at 13.
132 Id. at n.24.
133 400 F. Supp. at 758; 441 U.S. at 24.
134 Id. at 783.
135 Id. at 767.
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presence of blanket licensing can hardly be said to have a plainly an-
ticompetitive effect.
1 36
B. Blanket Licensing Under the Rule of Reason Standard
1. Justice Stevens' Dissent
The Supreme Court declined to evaluate blanket licensing under the rule
of reason 137 and instead opted to let the Second Circuit first address the
issue.13 8 Justice Stevens, however, thought the issue properly before the Court
and evaluated blanket licensing under the reasonableness criterion in his
dissenting opinion. 139 Justice Stevens concluded that blanket licensing violates
the rule of reason. 40 His conclusion relies on the patent pooling cases.
14'
Justice Stevens noted that the difference in the Court's holdings in the
Hazeltine142 cases turned on whether the patent pools were offered on an all-or-
nothing basis. Since ASCAP and BMI offered only blanket licenses, he found
ASCAP and BMI's practice to "fall on the illegal side of the line.'
' 43
Additionally, Justice Stevens found blanket licensing to have a stifling ef-
fect on competition. This effect resulted from two factors: 1) blanket licensing
restricts price competition among individual copyright owners 44 and 2) it
forecloses opportunities for new songwriters to gain market entrance through
price competition.
14 5
Justice Stevens' dissent warrants further analysis for several reasons.
First, it is a superficial application of the rule of reason standard which ignores
many of the findings of the district court.' 46 Second, Justice Stevens focused
only on one side of the reasonableness inquiry by ignoring the procompetitive
effects of blanket licensing. Finally, as did the Second Circuit, Justice Stevens
condemned blanket licensing as a conspiratorial constraint on competition, but
sought to preserve its existence and complement it with a more vile per use
license. 14 7 Thus, an analysis of blanket licensing under the criteria of Chicago
Board of Trade148 is necessary.
2. Rule of Reason Analysis
a. The History and Nature of the Industry
Prior to the development of performing rights societies the exclusive right
136 For a discussion of the competitive status of the performing rights market within the television in-
dustry see notes 157-163 and accompanying text infra.
137 See note 104 supra for a discussion of the rule of reason.
138 441 U.S. at 25 n.44.
139 Id. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 26. Justice Stevens found the record to be adequate to conduct a rule of reason inquiry. Id.
141 See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
142 339 U.S. 827 (1950); 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
143 441 U.S. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 32. Justice Stevens argued that price competiton between individual members is precluded
since it is no more expensive for a network to broadcast a hit tune on a prime time show than it is to use an
unknown song as background music in a midday soap opera. Consequently, popular songs are overused and
the rewards to established authors inflated. Id.
145 Id. at 32-33.
146 See text accompanying notes 149-162 infra.
147 Justice Stevens would affirm the Second Circuit's judgment. 441 U.S. at 26. See also 441 U.S. at 33.
148 See note 104 supra.
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to public performance of copyrighted works was virtually unenforceable.1 49
The right was almost valueless since owners did not have the facilities to
negotiate with users and police infringements.1 50 Users wishing to perform
compositions without infringing were, as a practical matter, unable to secure
licenses from owners. 151 Thus, prior to 1914 and the birth of ASCAP the per-
forming rights market was nonexistent. Indeed, ASCAP literally made a
market in which the needs of authors and users were satisfied .152
Since 1914 the performing rights market has changed radically. Radio and
television broadcasters have become the primary users of copyrighted music. 153
Hence, millions of performances of music are broadcasted annually, often in-
volving the simultaneous use of the same composition. To limit transaction
costs the blanket license was devised. 154 Until the CBS litigation all three major
television networks secured blanket licenses without complaint. CBS had re-
tained a blanket license for over thirty-five years without ever exploring alter-
native licensing arrangements.
155
b. The Nature of the Restraint
The blanket license has not operated unrestrained within the performing
rights market. It has remained under the constant scrutiny of the Justice
Department and the judiciary through numerous restrictions imposed by the
consent decrees, including the possibility of judicial fee-setting for ASCAP.
The licenses acquired by ASCAP and BMI both permit direct licensing, 156 and
this remains an alternative to blanket licensing.
The blanket license entitles the user to unlimited use of any composition in
the repertory of the issuing society. Fees for the license are negotiated as a
percentage of advertising revenues or as a flat amount. Licenses are normally
issued on an annual basis. Once collected, fees are distributed to the members
of each society. Authors only receive royalties if their compositions were actual-
ly performed.1
57
c. The Effect of the Restraint
Blanket licenses issued through performing rights societies created order
where chaos reigned. Consequently, artistic creations have become a profitable
product. Authors are now able to successfully market their achievements and
broadcasters have acquired the right to exploit musical works at modest costs.
Competition between authors has not starved in the process. Members of
performing rights societies compete for royalties within the societies since they
149 400 F. Supp. at 741.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 441 U.S. at 22-23.
153 400 F. Supp. at 741.
154 See note 24 supra.
155 400 F. Supp. at 752-54.
156 The 1950Judgment prohibits ASCAP from acquiring exclusive licensing rights. Although the 1966
Decree does not prohibit BMI from acquiring exclusive licensing privileges, it does enjoin BMI from deny-
ing one of its affiliates permission to license directly. See note 13 supra.
157 See notes 12 and 15 supra.
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only receive compensation if their works are performed. Accordingly, authors
vie for network performances. CBS, the "No. 1 outlet in the history of enter-
tainment and the giant of the world in the use of music rights" 158 is a prime
target of their efforts. It dominates many aspects of the music industry.1 5 9
Authors deluge the network with copies of their compositions in hope of obtain-
ing feature performances.160 Moreover, it is the possibility of a broadcast to
millions of viewers, the ticket to record and sheet music sales, and use by other
performers that primarily motivates authors to generate music, not potential
royalty distributions from ASCAP and BMI. 61 The market is a caldron of
competition; thousands of authors seeking the exposure of three television net-
works. 162
d. Conclusion: Is Blanket Licensing Unreasonable?
The district court opinion presents a plethora of proof that blanket licens-
ing has not suppressed or destroyed competition for performing rights. Com-
petition is thriving. Any lack of competition, price or otherwise, is not the
result of blanket licensing.
CBS's continuous use of blanket licenses since the late 1940's suggests that
it too has benefitted from the use of the system.1 63 Indeed, blanket licensing
and performing rights societies such as ASCAP may well be necessary to offset
the substantial leverage of CBS within the industry. Absent such a system the
works of individual authors could be performed for next to nothing by ex-
ploiting their dreams of cashing in on the proverbial pot of gold that potentially
follows national exposure. Such a result is intolerable in light of the Copyright
Act of 1976 and its goal of encouraging artistic creations.
Complementing the blanket license with a per use license hardly renders
the system less intolerable under the antitrust laws. Every condemnation of
blanket licensing under the Sherman Act would be at least equally applicable to
a per use license. Therefore, a search for a less restrictive alternative is
necessary.
V. Is There a Better Way?
The Supreme Court's failure to address blanket licensing under the rule of
reason standard will only prolong the legal nightmare that presently confronts
performing rights societies. The Second Circuit's original opinion suggests that
it will not respond favorably to blanket licensing on remand. Further, the nar-
rowness of the Supreme Court's decision indicates that blanket licensing will
come under attack from other sectors of the performing rights market.
158 400 F. Supp. at 771.
159 CBS is the largest manufacturer and seller of records and tapes in the world. In addition to the CBS
network, it owns numerous radio and television stations in major metropolitan areas throughout the United
States. Id. One author contends that the present licensing structure is necessary to offset the monopoly
power of the three television networks in the performing rights industry. See Grace, supra note 87, at 299.
160 400 F. Supp. at 771.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 742.
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To circumvent potential complex litigation, the Supreme Court should
address the legality of blanket licensing in all contexts. A piecemeal approach is
costly, both monetarily and in terms of judicial resources. Given the Court's
8-1 decision in CBS and generally favorable attitude, hopefully blanket licens-
ing will endure such an evaluation.
16 4
Acceptance of blanket licensing in its present form does, however, have
drawbacks. The spectre ofjudicial fee-setting definitely influences fee negotia-
tions. Its use as a dispute resolving mechanism, however, is questionable. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York hardly possesses expertise
in copyright-licensing fees. Resort to the district court would in most cases be
the equivalent of litigation.
The obstacles to judicial fee-setting probably explain, in part, why the
procedure has never been utilized. 165 Notwithstanding these limitations, the
concept of appeal to a fee-setting body after negotiations have failed has merit.
Perhaps a better body to carry out this function, however, is the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal. 166 This entity has experience in royalty rate setting and is
familiar with the intricacies of copyrighted musical compositions.
The goal of this process is to let buyers and sellers first attempt to come to
terms on license fees. There is no substitute for a negotiated price. Should these
efforts fail, resort could be made to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal with the
performing rights society having the burden of proving reasonableness.
Judicial review of the Tribunal's fee could then be had in accordance with the
Copyright Act. 167
VI. Conclusion
Blanket licensing has served the performing rights industry well. At pres-
ent it should withstand antitrust challenges under both the per se rule and the
rule of reason. 168 Judicial sanctioning by the Supreme Court, however, should
come at the earliest opportunity and address blanket licensing in all contexts.
Piecemeal resolution of the issue benefits no one.
The best thing that can be said for blanket licensing is that it works. Per-
forming rights societies should not be forced to tamper with success. If alter-
natives to blanket licensing are demanded by certain sectors of performing
164 Other solutions have been tendered, including a legislative exemption from the antitrust laws for per-
forming rights societies and an overseeing federal agency. See Note, supra note 24, at 801-803. Price regula-
tion through judicial or legislative fee setting has been discussed also. See Cirace, supra note 87, at 300-306.
165 See note 32 supra.
166 See generally 17 U.S.C. §5 801-810 (1976). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal is currently authorized to
adjust copyright royalty rates for compulsory licenses for the use of copyrighted works: 1) to make and
distribute phonorecords; 2) injukeboxes; 3) for secondary transmission by cable systems; and 4) in noncom-
mercial broadcasting. 17 U.S.C. S 801(b) (1976).
167 17 U.S.C. § 810 (1976).
168 CBS's other antitrust challenges, including illegal tying arrangement and monopolization charges,
were rejected by both the district court and the Second Circuit. 400 F. Supp. at 781-83; 562 F.2d at 130,
132, 135, 141 n.29.
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rights users, those avenues should be explored through their own initiative.
The present structure provides ample opportunity for the inquisitive.169
Glenn A. Clark
169 After the completion of this article the Second Circuit upheld the legality of blanket licensing on re-
mand. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
No. 75-7600 (2d Cir. April 3, 1980). The court never reached a reasonableness inquiry, concluding that
blanket licensing is not even a restraint of trade in light of market alternatives such as direct licensing. Id. at
2227.
Hopefully blanket licensing will withstand future assaults under the antitrust statutes. The Second Cir-
cuit's failure to address blanket licensing under the rule of reason suggests that the copyright-antitrust con-
flict is hardly over, but must await resolution of pending litigation. See note 103 supra. Indeed, carte blanche
sanctioning of blanket licensing under the antitrust laws remains only a dream to performing rights
societies
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